HAMLIN
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

July 2019

Second Quarter 2019 Update

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Overview

Hamlin equity accounts advanced over the last three months. The S&P 500 gained 4.30% during the second quarter as increasing odds of a Federal Reserve interest rate reduction trumped trade war concerns. Our municipal bond portfolios increased in value, benefiting from lower market interest rates and mild spread compression.

We are returning to a "question and answer" format for the summer-time newsletter. We have tried to answer the questions posed most frequently by our clients and business partners over the last few months.

Performance

Equity Performance

The Hamlin Equity Composite increased 3.57% during the second quarter, lagging the S&P 500 Index's 4.30% quarterly return[1], but finishing ahead of many of our ETF and actively-managed dividend fund competitors. It was a frenetic quarter. The "sell in May, go away" maxim seemed to hold true until dovish Fed speak drove the S&P 500 Index to its best June since 1955. Value stocks continue to lag growth stocks. The Russell 3000 Growth Index climbed 21.41% through the end of June of this year, surpassing the Russell 3000 Value Index's 16.05% gain. Our 12.98% return year-to-date is more in line with the all-capitalization Russell 3000 Value Index and the Dow Jones U.S. Select Dividend Index's 13.49% advance. Please remember that we are not managing your account to track or beat any index. We don't select securities to align your portfolio with any index's sector weightings or holdings. We aim to construct a quality portfolio with high current income. Our goal is to preserve client capital, while protecting against inflation with future dividend increases and long-term capital appreciation. We are highly focused on achieving an 8-10% annual return target for clients through cycles.[2]

As stock market volatility returns, we hope that you find comfort in knowing that Hamlin stocks pay a compensatory and growing cash return. We believe that our holdings are managed by executives who demonstrate a commitment to increase future dividend payouts. We are investing in businesses with high dividend yields, manageable debt, attractive returns on equity, and ample free cash flow-to-dividend coverage ratios. We are happy to report that 25 of Hamlin's holdings have announced dividend hikes so far this year, with an average year-over-year boost of 5.8%. This welcome action validates our research analysis, increases your portfolio cash flow, and reminds us that your dividend stream is not fixed.

[1] The performance provided is a preliminary estimate as Q2 performance has not yet been examined by ACA Performance Services and may be subject to change.

[2] There can be no guarantee that the return target will be met going forward.

Figure 1: Equity Performance

	HAMLIN EQUITY COMPOSITE (Net of Fees)	Cumulative	S&P 500 (No Transaction Costs or Fees)	Cumulative
2001	0.99	100.99	(11.93)	88.07
2002	0.90	101.90	(22.06)	68.64
2003	30.40	132.87	28.68	88.33
2004	22.80	163.17	10.88	97.94
2005	20.80	197.11	4.91	102.75
2006	7.90	212.69	15.79	118.97
2007	3.97	221.13	5.49	125.50
2008	(28.57)	157.95	(37.00)	79.07
2009	20.98	191.09	26.46	99.99
2010	20.65	230.55	15.06	115.05
2011	10.16	253.98	2.11	117.47
2012	11.03	281.99	16.00	136.27
2013	32.72	374.26	32.39	180.41
2014	10.93	415.16	13.69	205.10
2015	(4.54)	396.32	1.38	207.93
2016	14.93	455.49	11.96	232.80
2017	15.84	527.63	21.83	283.62
2018	(6.97)	490.86	(4.38)	271.20
YTD 2019	12.98	554.57	18.54	321.48
18.50 Years Annual Compound	**9.70**		**6.52**	

Source: Hamlin Capital Management. YTD 2019 performance has not yet been examined by our independent verification service provider ACA Performance Services. See GIPS disclosure at the end of this report.

Equity Q&A

Q: Where is the stock market headed?

At approximately 17.7x 2019 earnings[3], equity valuations have climbed back to the late September 2018 level from which the scary fourth quarter 19.75% stock market decline began. Multiple expansion and the market's 18.54% year-to-date climb —the best first half since 1997—reflect prospects for Federal Reserve interest rate cuts. Investors are hopeful that the Fed can fix the inverted yield curve, engineering the proverbial soft landing and extending the economic expansion. While it has happened in the past, it sure feels odd to be contemplating multiple rate cuts with the S&P 500 Index at an all-time high. Typically, the central bankers are riding to the rescue as stocks are diving and the manufacturing sector is contracting.

[3] S&P 500 index as of June 30, 2019 divided by current 2019 earnings estimate of approximately $166.

Figure 2: Fed rate cuts vs. ISM manufacturing



Source: ISM, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research

It appears that investors are confident that declining corporate confidence, flatlining capital expenditures, and the related softness in the purchasing manager indices are temporary phenomena. While we think the marginally brighter prospects for sustainable trade détente could increase corporate spending, we suspect that the Powell Fed has yet to commit to meaningful rate cuts. Moreover, we aren't convinced that lower Federal Funds rates will provide the anticipated elixir. History broadly suggests that rate cuts lead to higher stock prices over the following year. From 1984-1998, each of the five rate cutting cycles were followed by 12 month returns for the S&P 500 of 14-23%. However, the last 2 rate cutting cycles were a different story. The 2001 rate cut was followed by an approximate 12% one year drop and an eventual ~41% loss from rate cut to the ultimate bottom. The 2007 cut preceded around an 18% 12-month descent and eventual ~54% plunge to the 2009 generational low.[4] We also wonder whether starting a rate reduction cycle from a 2.5% Federal Funds rate will provide the desired outcome that the 1980's cuts had exhibited from their towering 9.5% starting point. Are Americans really going to borrow more this fall after a potential rate cut if they cannot afford that desired asset today? Absolute rates seem low enough right now.

We also think the U.S. presidential and congressional election will influence stocks over the months to come. Equities are already following the script, producing double digit returns during "year three" of the presidential cycle. Although the election remains over a year away, we expect the 24-hour political news cycle will start to weigh on investors' minds. We are going to hear a lot of progressive ideas, many of which are business unfriendly. The widening budget deficit and increasing income inequality could invite proposals to roll back components of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 and introduce new tax increases. Investors will also anticipate an increasing regulatory burden across the healthcare, financial, technology and energy sectors. As we get closer to November of 2020, we are likely to remind you of the power of the incumbency and the middle class's improving income profile. In the meantime, we worry that a

[4] According to Goldman Sachs report "US Macroscope: Why lower interest rates may not lead to higher equity prices."

combination of President Trump's low popularity rating and media support for anti-growth candidates may weigh on stocks.[5]

We still think that the sell-off in Q4 last year might have been the shot across the bow. The longer the yield curve remains inverted, the greater the chance a recession is on the investment horizon. The 10-year Treasury yield is now over 50bps below the Fed Funds rate. The smallest inversion that signalled a recession was an average -15bps inversion over a 10 week period. After extended periods (12 months) in 1989, 2000 and 2007 when Fed Funds were significantly above 10 year Treasury bond yields, recessions followed. It feels to us like the current price-to-earnings multiple and all-time high stock market has baked in a lot of good news.

Q: Will value stocks ever outperform?

Value strategies are underperforming growth strategies to a historic degree.

Figure 3: Value vs. Growth Differential



Source: Woodford, based on Fama and French data, WSJ Daily Shot.

According to the chart above, we are in the midst of extreme dispersion. Based simply on mean reversion, value stocks should eventually outperform growth stocks to get back to the historical trend level. Stifel Nicolaus strategist Barry Bannister argues that value stocks are typically stronger than growth peers in periods of low overall market returns. And given strong returns over the past decade – the S&P 500 just compounded at 14.71% per year for the last ten years through June – Mr. Bannister expects a 3-4% annual return for the next 10 years, with 2% from dividends. The S&P 500 has compounded at 9.49% a year since 1928, so some mean reversion to correct the excess returns of the last ten years should be expected. And perhaps that is an environment where the price you pay – i.e. valuation – will once again matter to investors. In the meantime, a recent Ned Davis Research report argues that sluggish GDP growth and

[5] President Trump's current approval rating is 41%, the term average to date rating is 40%, with the highest and lowest approval ratings over the term of 46% and 35% respectively. Gallup.com.

recession fears drive stock pickers to focus on the most visible secular growers. In other words, the economy may need to sustainably grow on its own, without assistance from the Fed, for value strategies to regain their prominence in investor portfolios. NDR goes on to remind us that value strategies lean heavily on the financial sector, so a steeper yield curve would certainly be helpful.[6]

We have been considering the possibility that the tide has started to turn. A year ago on these same pages, we posited that the FAANG growth stocks were close to a top. Using the Nifty Fifty stocks from the 1970s as a guide, we predicted that growth stock trees do not grow to the sky and that valuations might eventually matter. Since then the group of five FAANG stocks are up an average of around 1.8% while the Hamlin Equity Composite is up 6.26%.[7] In fact three of the five FAANG stocks are down!

Figure 4: Value Stocks Trading at the Steepest Discount in History



Source: "The Value Conundrum" report published by JP Morgan analyst Dubravko Lakos-Bujas

Q: Can you describe HCM Equity portfolio return prospects?

Out of favor value stocks result in an attractively valued Hamlin portfolio. At 12.1x forward consensus earnings estimates, your portfolio trades at a 28% discount to the S&P 500's PE.[8] The portfolio's 8.3x average EV/EBITDA ratio also compares quite favorably to the market's heady 11.7x multiple. The portfolio's free cash flow yield of 7.4% not only looks attractive relative to the median S&P 500 company's 5.3% yield but also covers a generous 4.1% average yield 1.7x. The numerous dividend increase announcements from our companies' year to date express optimism in their businesses and cash flows. They also serve to keep the Hamlin Equity Composite current yield above 4%, even after strong appreciation. Our dividend discount models and earnings power models project meaningful average upside of 23% to target prices.[9] Debt levels are manageable with an average 36.2% net debt-to-capital ratio, and

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[6] "Will Value Ever Outperform Again" 5/30/19 report by Ed Clissold, CFA, US Market Strategist.

[7] Performance is provided for the period 6/30/2018 to 6/30/2019.

[8] Data is provided for the Hamlin Equity Composite. Individual accounts may vary.

[9] Please note that potential upside to Hamlin's price targets are not guaranteed.

five-year average returns on equity are attractive at 24.1%. Our portfolio valuation not only appears attractive on an absolute basis, but our discount to the overall stock market is at the widest level in years.

Figure 5: Hamlin Equity Composite PE vs. S&P 500 PE multiple



Source: Bloomberg LP

Although value strategies have been out of favor, the dividend paying variety may have some tailwinds. We have long expressed doubt that high yielding stocks are highly correlated to interest rate movements over the long term. Shorter term may be a different story. Since the 1970s, there have been nine rate cutting cycles. On average, the first cut of the cycle is bullish for payers. The chart below suggests payers outperform non payers leading up to the rate cut, and then outperform by 5% in the first year after.

Figure 6: Rate Cuts Bullish for Dividend Stocks



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In addition, as this rate cutting cycle is about to commence, dividend paying stocks are at their cheapest valuation versus non payers in fourteen years.

Figure 7: S&P 500 Median Forward PEs of Dividend Payers minus Dividend Non-Payers



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All of this suggests to us that valuations seem reasonable for our asset class. If a lower equity return environment is in our future, we will take our chances with a portfolio trading at 12.1x earnings and paying over 4% to own it.

Fixed Income Q&A

Q: What is the environment for Interest Rates and Fund Flows this year?

After rising last year, interest rates have steadily decreased this year – perhaps more than anyone anticipated given that the most recent Federal Funds Rate hike was just last December. Those hikes seem like a distant memory now. The benchmark 10-year Treasury ended 2018 at 2.69% (already off its November high of 3.23%) and finished the first half of 2019 at 2.00%. Even a U.S economy that continues to expand hasn't been able to quell the fear of slowdowns in China and Europe and the looming threat of an all-out trade war with China. The global threats to the U.S. economy have prompted Chairman Powell and the Fed to move from a stance of "patience" to one of actively forecasting rate **cuts** for this year. This may have seemed unlikely at the start of the year and nothing is set in stone (as the positive June total nonfarm payroll number may show) but the market currently is pricing in a 100% chance that the Fed will cut the target rate in July with potentially more cuts later this year. Even if the Fed doesn't cut and given the dearth of "higher" yielding options in the market, it seems unlikely that buyers around the world would allow the 10-year Treasury to get much higher before swooping in. Even 2% looks fairly attractive when compared to the 10-year German Bund at negative 35 basis points or any of the other $13 trillion in negative yielding global government debt.

Municipal interest rates have declined this year on the strength of treasuries. In addition the tidal wave of cash pouring into the coffers of municipal mutual funds has helped depress tax-exempt rates even further. The benchmark AAA 10-year Muni ended the 2nd quarter at 1.63%. Through the first two quarters of 2019, all Muni Funds took in a whopping $43 billion and High Yield alone took in close to $10 billion.[10] That compares to less than $2 billion last year into High Yield and an outflow for all munis. The demand is evident in the secondary market, where funds are bidding bonds in excess of their prior day pricing. It is also evident in the primary market where "Street deals" are getting done at rates far below the level we think adequately compensates the investor. This has been across all credit classes of municipals as the demand for bonds exceeds the supply available in the market. We believe the new tax code, which severely limits the State and Local Tax deduction, has helped push even more cash into municipal strategies seeking to limit additional personal tax liabilities. Perhaps more broadly, as global rates remain exceedingly low across the board, capital is moving to any place it can find a yield slightly better than 1% or 2% - this even includes crossover buyers in the muni space.

Q: Given the return to a low(er) interest rate environment, where are you finding opportunities to invest client funds?

Unfortunately, the interest rate and fund flow data points to a dynamic in our corner of the muni market where Street deal pricing remains unattractive for our clients and we continue to double down on our strategy of sourcing, structuring, and buying offerings away from the market. While disappointing from an opportunity perspective, as frequent readers of this section can attest, this is a movie we have seen before – prior to the last financial crisis and again in 2014 until the election in 2016. When rates plumb lows and the market is fighting to invest money, we slow down – we have no qualms playing foil to the hare – slow and

[10] Lipper.

steady wins the race. In fact, we used the downtick in yields this year to sell some bonds at premium prices, locking in gains to generate an all-in after tax return on investment for the client that we believe is attractive. We don't often look to move bonds out of the portfolio, even at a premium. However, when we can sell bonds for clients at prices far north of what we would pay, sometimes the risk/reward pendulum swings towards sell. Until rates move up again, we will look to selectively sell where it makes sense, always factoring in the tax consequences of such actions.

As we preach over and over, the key to generating sustainable returns is through the income derived from the tax-exempt coupons and we refuse to compromise on either the absolute rate or spread at which we acquire those coupons for clients. We feel this is a superior way to generate returns than buying low coupon bonds and hoping interest rates go down even further. We simply refuse to put money to work below appropriate absolute yields, even in low interest rate environments. And while interest rates are low for now, we continue to prepare the portfolio for any interest rate environment. If interest rates do rebound upward, the income from clients' bonds is not affected by rising interest rates and the ability to reinvest at prevailing rates is a powerful multiplier. Further, the steps we have taken over the last three years to limit the duration of the portfolio means that price moves should be less pronounced than comparable investments that lack these features. Regardless of which direction rates move, we feel our strategy will provide tax efficient income during all market cycles and levels of volatility.

Q: With such strong fund flows and demand, are you seeing covenant light deals?

Yes. We have seen behaviour this year reminiscent of the 2006/2007 credit cycle. Deals are getting done without appropriate covenants packages, lacking proper remedies, and in some cases without the basic reserve funds that are standard in municipal project finance deals. This is not overly surprising given the way that many funds raise and deploy capital. However, rest assured this is not the way Hamlin puts client money to work.

We are committed to ensuring the absolute yield is commensurate with the risk but we are resolute in securing our full covenant packages for these deals. We do not relax covenants, remedies, or reserve funds requirements for Hamlin-sourced financings. We have walked away from several deals this year and will continue to do so if necessary. We are cautioning clients that it may take longer to get them invested but we ask for patience as we strive to protect their capital and invest it prudently. Finally, as a reminder (and a potential governor on investment), Hamlin partners are invested alongside Hamlin clients on these bond deals.

Performance

The Hamlin Capital Management Municipal Bond Composite for the first half of 2019 delivered a return of 5.43%.[11] As the market bounces around, we strive to continuously deliver a robust stream of tax-exempt income to clients. We believe that we have positioned the portfolio in a way that will capture value for

[11] The performance provided is a preliminary estimate as Q2 performance has not yet been examined by ACA Performance Services, and may be subject to change.

clients regardless of the direction interest rates take. Hamlin will endeavor to continue to buy bonds with attractive absolute yields at above market spreads for HCM clients.

We remain dedicated to our fundamental credit analysis and research. In general, our portfolio holdings in essential social service projects in the Education and Senior Living sectors continue to perform well. HCM clients should rest assured that their bonds are generally secured by a first mortgage on property, plant, and equipment, not a pledge of *ad valorem* tax revenue. As always, we are committed to capital preservation and income generation.

Figure 8: Fixed Income Performance

	HAMLIN BOND COMPOSITE (% Net of Fees)	**Cumulative**	**BARCLAYS HIGH YIELD MUNICIPAL INDEX** (No Transaction Costs or Fees)	**Cumulative**
2001	4.54	104.54	4.45	104.45
2002	7.22	112.04	1.97	106.51
2003	9.14	122.20	13.22	120.59
2004	8.27	131.37	10.52	133.27
2005	7.94	141.81	8.58	144.71
2006	6.81	151.47	10.74	160.26
2007	4.27	157.93	-2.28	156.60
2008	-16.73	131.51	-27.01	114.31
2009	16.35	153.00	32.73	151.72
2010	7.06	163.81	7.80	163.56
2011	6.13	173.86	9.25	178.68
2012	7.43	186.78	18.14	211.10
2013	2.48	191.42	-5.51	199.47
2014	7.18	205.16	13.84	227.07
2015	4.80	214.97	1.81	231.18
2016	3.84	223.24	2.99	238.09
2017	8.22	241.59	9.69	261.17
2018	4.25	251.85	4.76	273.60
YTD 2019	5.43	265.53	6.66	291.82
18.50 Years Annual Compound	**5.42**		**5.96**	

Source: Hamlin Capital Management. 2019 YTD performance has not yet been examined by our independent verification service provider, ACA Performance Services. See GIPS disclosure at the end of this report.

As a reminder, Hamlin manages client assets based on the individual needs of each client. Please contact us if there have been any changes in your financial situation or investment objectives, or if you wish to impose any reasonable restrictions on the management of your account or reasonably modify existing restrictions.

Thank you sincerely for your trust and confidence. Please call (212) 752-8777 with any questions or suggestions.

Joe Bridy Chris D’Agnes Charlie Garland Mark Stitzer

Benjamin Kaufman Parker Stitzer Michael Tang

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES:

PAST PERFORMANCE DOES NOT GUARANTEE FUTURE RESULTS. Investing, particularly in equities, involves the risk of a loss of principal. Any projections, targets, or estimates in this report are forward looking statements and are based on Hamlin Capital Management, LLC ("HCM")'s research, analysis, and incorporate assumptions made by HCM. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice and HCM undertakes no obligation to update the statements presented herein. While HCM believes the sources of all data provided in this presentation are reliable, HCM does not guarantee accuracy, reliability or completeness. Data is presented as of the date indicated and HCM does undertake any duty to update the information presented here.

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DEFINITIONS

- *The S&P 500 Index is a market capitalization-weighted index consisting of 500 stocks chosen for market size, liquidity, and industry group representation, with each stock's weight in the Index proportionate to its market value.*
- *The Russell 3000 Growth Index is a market capitalization-weighted index of the growth segment of the 3,000 largest U.S. public companies.*
- *The Russell 3000 Value Index is a market capitalization-weighted index of the value segment of the 3,000 largest U.S. public companies.*
- *Dow Jones U.S. Select Dividend Index is an index composed of relatively high dividend paying companies.*
- *AAA MMD Curve is a proprietary yield curve that provides the offer-side of "AAA" rated state general obligation bonds, as determined by the MMD analyst team.*
- *Capital expenditures are funds a company spends in order to acquire, upgrade, and maintain physical assets such as property, buildings, an industrial plant, technology, or equipment.*
- *Dividend yield is the ratio of a company's annual dividend compared to its share price.*
- *Free Cash Flow represents the cash a company is able to generate after required investment to maintain or expand its asset base.*
- *Return on equity is a measure of financial performance calculated by dividing net income by shareholders' equity.*
- *PE: The Price-to-Earnings Ratio or PE ratio is a ratio for valuing a company that measures its current share price relative to its per-share earnings. The price-earnings ratio can be calculated as: Market Value per Share / Earnings per Share.*
- *Purchasing Managers Index is an index of the prevailing direction of economic trends in the manufacturing and service sectors. It consists of a diffusion index that indicates, based on purchasing managers, if market conditions are expanding, stable, or contracting.*

Hamlin Capital Management, LLC
Equity Only Composite
Annual Disclosure Presentation
January 1, 2001 through March 31, 2019

Year	Total Firm Assets (mm)	Composite Assets (mm)	Number of Portfolios	Composite Net Return	S&P 500 Return	Internal Dispersion	Composite 3-Yr St Dev	S&P 500 3-Yr St Dev
*YTD 2019	4,398	1,569	673	9.08%	13.65%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2018	4,253	1,504	688	-6.97%	-4.38%	0.64%	10.37	10.80
2017	4,553	1,772	683	15.84%	21.83%	1.29%	10.27	9.92
2016	3,617	1,623	679	14.93%	11.96%	1.26%	11.05	10.59
2015	3,186	1,373	725	-4.54%	1.38%	0.66%	9.91	10.48
2014	3,077	1,414	704	10.93%	13.69%	0.51%	8.57	8.97
2013	2,703	1,234	624	32.72%	32.39%	1.04%	10.19	11.94
2012	2,029	798	480	11.03%	16.00%	1.12%	12.39	15.09
2011	1,623	584	388	10.16%	2.11%	0.71%	14.11	18.71
2010	1,033	191	220	20.65%	15.06%	2.22%		
2009	714	30	51	20.98%	26.46%	2.69%		
2008	584	12	30	-28.57%	-37.00%	4.45%		
2007	734	18	31	3.97%	5.49%	2.86%		
2006	869	29	48	7.90%	15.79%	5.93%		
2005	716	31	42	20.80%	4.91%	4.90%		
2004	501	19	26	22.80%	10.88%	7.67%		
2003	130	8	24	30.40%	28.68%	9.87%		
2002	49	5	29	0.90%	-22.06%	6.15%		
2001	21	6	34	0.99%	-11.93%	10.69%		

* Performance represents a non-annualized partial period return ending on March 31, 2019.

Equity Only Composite consists of fully discretionary accounts that are comprised of any amount of common stocks and cash. There is no minimum account size or time period to be included in the composite. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. The exchange rate source for the composite is IDSI/IDC – FT Interactive Data Corporation. The S&P 500 index is provided solely as a widely recognized index. The index is in no way indicative of the strategy employed in this composite. It is the position of Hamlin Capital Management, LLC ("Hamlin") that a meaningful benchmark is not available for this strategy due to the frequent and customized changes in allocation in individual accounts. Benchmark returns are not covered by the report of independent verifiers.

PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. Investing entails the risk of loss of principal. The U.S. Dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented net of management fees and includes the reinvestment of all income. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. The annual composite dispersion is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite performance is presented net of foreign dividend withholding taxes, where applicable, for the period prior to October 1, 2016, and gross of foreign dividend withholding taxes thereafter. Composite performance accrues dividends starting October 1, 2016. The management fee schedule is as follows: 1.00% on all assets. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary. Composite performance is shown net of custodial fees for the period prior to January 1, 2018, and gross of custodial fees and other charges that may occur as a result of a client's choice of service providers thereafter.

Hamlin is an independent registered investment advisory firm. Hamlin invests in fixed income and equities for separately managed accounts, as well as funds. In January 2004, Hamlin merged with RRH Capital Management Inc. and the performance returns are linked. The firm maintains a complete list and description of composites, which is available upon request. A copy of our current written disclosure statement discussing our advisory services and fees continues to remain available for your review upon request.

The Equity Only Composite was created April 1, 2006. Hamlin claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Hamlin has been independently verified for the periods January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2008 by Ashland Partners & Company LLP. ACA Performance Services began verification for Hamlin on January 1, 2009 through March 31, 2019. Verification assesses whether (1) the firm has complied with all the composite construction requirements of the GIPS standards on a firm-wide basis and (2) the firm's policies and procedures are designed to calculate and present performance in compliance with the GIPS standards. The Equity Only Composite has been examined for the periods beginning January 1, 2001 through March 31, 2019. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request. The policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance and preparing compliant presentations are available upon request.

Hamlin Capital Management, LLC

Bond Only Composite

Annual Disclosure Presentation

January 1, 2001 through March 31, 2019

Year	Total Firm Assets (mm)	Composite Assets (mm)	Number of Portfolios	Composite Net Return	BHYMBI Return	Internal Dispersion	Composite 3-Yr St Dev	BHYMBI 3-Yr St Dev
*YTD 2019	4,398	775	249	2.89%	3.83%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2018	4,253	789	245	4.25%	4.76%	0.64%	3.04	4.91
2017	4,553	733	234	8.22%	9.69%	1.67%	2.82	5.42
2016	3,617	634	219	3.84%	2.99%	0.76%	2.54	5.96
2015	3,186	758	193	4.80%	1.81%	0.77%	0.99	6.35
2014	3,077	538	138	7.18%	13.84%	1.03%	1.14	6.22
2013	2,703	546	190	2.48%	-5.51%	0.84%	1.44	5.90
2012	2,029	474	172	7.43%	18.14%	1.39%	1.52	4.17
2011	1,623	442	173	6.13%	9.25%	0.86%	2.67	7.81
2010	1,033	314	124	7.06%	7.80%	0.84%		
2009	714	220	90	16.35%	32.73%	1.64%		
2008	584	181	67	-16.73%	-27.01%	1.80%		
2007	734	173	50	4.27%	-2.28%	0.96%		
2006	869	153	55	6.81%	10.74%	1.14%		
2005	716	86	53	7.94%	8.58%	1.84%		
2004	501	53	33	8.27%	10.52%	1.61%		
2003	130	18	27	9.14%	13.22%	2.19%		
2002	49	17	29	7.22%	1.97%	2.63%		
2001	21	17	31	4.54%	4.45%	15.07%		

* Performance represents a non-annualized partial period return ending on March 31, 2019.

Bond Only Composite consists of fully discretionary bond only accounts that are comprised of any amount of bonds and cash. There is a 1 year waiting period to be included in the composite. There is no minimum account size for inclusion in the composite. The Bloomberg-Barclays High Yield Municipal Bond Index (BHYMBI) is provided solely to allow for comparison to a widely recognized index. The index is in no way indicative of the strategy employed in this composite. It is the position of Hamlin Capital Management, LLC ("Hamlin") position that a meaningful benchmark is not available for this strategy due to the frequent and customized changes in allocation in individual accounts. Benchmark returns are not covered by the report of independent verifiers.

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