HAMLIN
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

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Q2 2022 Quarterly Newsletter

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Overview

Hamlin equity accounts declined approximately 11.23% during the second quarter while the S&P 500 Index lost 16.10% over the same period. Recession fears intensified as the Federal Reserve reacted to an elevated Consumer Price Index report with strong words and action. Hamlin bond accounts declined 1.33%. The Barclays High Yield Municipal Bond Index lost 5.61% as spreads widened modestly and interest rates increased over the quarter.

Equity Performance

Hamlin equities are down 12.08% year-to-date through June 30th. This compares favorably to the S&P 500's 19.96% decline. Our above average dividend yields, free cash flow generation, attractive returns on capital, and manageable debt levels appear to be cushioning the blow. These results follow a 31.32% increase in Hamlin stocks during calendar 2021. We were pleased to beat the S&P 500 Index for the quarter. We attribute our outperformance versus the broader market to relative strength from our Consumer Discretionary, Industrial and Healthcare holdings. The Russell 1000 Value Index ETF ("IWD") declined 12.29% points in the quarter – in line with Hamlin's performance – as Value-oriented strategies continue to outperform the broader market. The Dow Jones U.S. Dividend Index ETF ("DVY") is performing well this year due to its large exposure to the defensive Utility sector.

Figure 1: Hamlin Composite Returns vs. Benchmarks as of June 30, 2022

	2Q '22	YTD '22	1-year	3-year	5-year	10-year	Inception
Hamlin Composite	-11.23%	-12.08%	-3.23%	9.38%	8.81%	10.63%	9.65%
Russell 1000 Value Index ETF (IWD)	-12.29%	-12.95%	-6.96%	6.76%	6.99%	10.30%	6.57%
Dow Jones U.S. Dividend Index ETF (DVY)	-7.53%	-2.68%	3.95%	9.60%	8.74%	11.39%	NA
S&P 500 Index	-16.10%	-19.96%	-10.62%	10.60%	11.31%	12.96%	7.08%

Source: Hamlin Capital Management. Performance is net of fees and periods over 1 year are annualized. 2Q22 performance has not yet been examined by our independent GIPS verification service provider ACA Performance Services. See GIPS disclosure at the end of this report. 1/1/01 Inception.

When evaluating performance relative to benchmarks, recall that we don't select securities to align your portfolio with any index's sector weightings or holdings. We aim to construct a quality portfolio with high current income. Our goal is to preserve client capital while protecting against inflation with future dividend increases and long-term capital appreciation. Our 9.65% compound annual net return since inception indicates that an actively managed, concentrated portfolio of generous dividend paying stocks can provide attractive absolute and relative returns over time.

Equity Portfolio Discussion

Genuine Parts Company, Johnson & Johnson, and Sanofi led the portfolio during Q2 – gaining 2.75% on average.[1] Surging used car sales and elevated miles driven back to pre-pandemic levels are driving demand for Genuine Parts' NAPA Auto Parts. Angst over the economic cycle increased investor focus on Johnson & Johnson's and Sanofi's recession-resistant revenue streams. Johnson & Johnson reiterated full year guidance and its MedTech business

[1] Hasbro, Inc. and Snap-on Incorporated were the 4th and 5th top contributors – declining 2.73% on average.

rebounded more quickly than expected from Omicron-related slowdowns. For Sanofi, both sales and margins exceeded estimates in the recent quarter, driven by a 46% increase in sales of Dupixent.

Target, Broadcom, and Ares Management were the weakest quarterly performers – declining 28.22% on average.[2] Target cut margin assumptions for the June quarter as they markdown slow-moving inventory. Management failed to fully anticipate a post-Covid shift in demand from goods to services, and elevated inflation curtailed demand for non-essentials. Customer traffic and market share are still growing. We think the stock is undervalued at 13.8x[3] forward earnings, and the recent 20% dividend increase pays us to be patient. Despite strong Q1 earnings results, Broadcom eventually succumbed to pervasive weakness in the Technology sector. Street estimates for Ares' earnings declined modestly due to softer performance-related fees, and investors worry that rising credit spreads will lead to credit fund mark-downs. We remain committed to all three holdings.

We purchased three new positions during the quarter: United Parcel Service (UPS), Union Pacific (UNP), and Unilever (UL) – our first new positions of the year. For UPS, stock market weakness and a 49% dividend hike presented the opportunity to invest in one of America's leading logistics providers. E-commerce growth should be a sustainable revenue driver, and we are excited about CEO Carol Tomé's plans to prioritize value over volume. A recent focus on capital expenditure discipline and shareholder returns at competitor FedEx may improve industry dynamics. Union Pacific is one of the handful of Class 1 railroads in the U.S., an asset whose value should continue to increase as America's economy grows, along with our need to transport goods. Higher diesel prices may allow railroads to take market share from trucks and grow volumes at above GDP growth rates. Unilever is one of the world's pre-eminent Consumer Staples companies with brands such as Dove, Hellman's, and Knorr. We believe there is significant potential for the trading multiple to expand as the company embarks on a transformational restructuring process to increase accountability and speed of decision making. The recent addition of Nelson Peltz to the Unilever board could accelerate these changes. We sold Steel Dynamics (STLD), Sanofi (SNY), and Cisco (CSCO) in the quarter.

Sixteen of our twenty-six quarter end holdings have announced dividend hikes so far this year at an above-CPI average rate of 13.78%. These actions validate our research analysis and increase your portfolio cash flow. Corporate boards generally announce dividend increases when they envision strong cash flow growth in the future. Client income has been compounding at 10.12% over the last ten years through 2021[4], and we aspire to grow portfolio income at a mid-single digit rate or higher over time.

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[2] Lamar Advertising Co and KeyCorp were the 4th and 5th top detractors – declining 22.73% on average.

[3] As of 6/30/22. Factset.

[4] The 10-year CAGR of portfolio income reflects the increase in income for calendar 2011 through 2021 for the universe of accounts defined below. Portfolio income growth is updated on an annual basis. Future growth may be materially different and is not guaranteed. Income is shown net of foreign dividend withholding taxes for the period prior to 10/1/2016 and gross subsequent. Income includes dividend accruals starting 10/1/2016. The income and performance shown is for the universe of accounts, measured annually, that: (1) had no contributions or withdrawals other than Hamlin's management fee in the year that income and portfolio value was captured, (2) was open for the entirety of the year in question; and (3) present in the equity only composite. The values and income were captured on a year-by-year basis and normalized based on the prior year values with a starting value of $1,000,000. While Hamlin believes that the performance for the accounts are representative of the Equity Only Composite, some differences may exist and performance may diverge from that of the Equity Only Composite going forward. Due to the time period requirements for inclusion, a survivorship bias may be present as only a small fraction of composite accounts are included. Dividend growth represents the average dividend increase of the companies that raised their dividend while they were owned in the Equity Only Composite. Individual portfolio and the Equity Only Composite returns and dividend income vary.

Equity Market & Portfolio Outlook

On June 13th the S&P 500 Index entered its 27th bear market since 1928. Having compounded at 16.55% for ten years, the S&P 500 Index return was due for a reversion towards the long-term 9.74% annual equity return.[5] Elevated inflation is the culprit, and the Federal Reserve's interest rate hikes and balance sheet reduction are designed to reduce consumer prices to more manageable levels. While institutional investors never welcome higher interest rates, they are particularly concerned to see the central bank tighten into an already slowing economy.

Figure 2: All Bear Markets Since WWII

Bear Markets for the S&P 500			
High Date	**Low Date**	**% Change**	**#Days**
5/29/1946	5/17/1947	**(28.78)**	**353**
6/15/1948	6/13/1949	**(20.57)**	**363**
8/2/1956	10/22/1957	**(21.63)**	**446**
12/12/1961	6/26/1962	**(27.97)**	**196**
2/9/1966	10/7/1966	**(22.18)**	**240**
11/29/1968	5/26/1970	**(36.06)**	**543**
1/11/1973	10/3/1974	**(48.20)**	**630**
11/28/1980	8/12/1982	**(27.11)**	**622**
8/25/1987	12/4/1987	**(33.51)**	**101**
3/24/2000	9/21/2001	**(36.77)**	**546**
1/4/2002	10/9/2002	**(33.75)**	**278**
10/9/2007	11/20/2008	**(51.93)**	**408**
1/6/2009	3/9/2009	**(27.62)**	**62**
2/19/2020	3/23/2020	**(33.92)**	**33**
Mean		**(32.14)**	**344**
Median		**(31.15)**	**358**

Figure 3: Recession Year Market Declines Since WWII



Figure 2: Ned Davis Research. Bull (bear) market defined as a minimum 20% change (gain/loss) in price level.

Figure 3: Goldman Sachs GIR and Hamlin Capital Management. The grey bar reflects the S&P 500 Index's 19.96% 2022 decline as of 6/30/22.

Price-to-earnings ratios are no longer extended[6], but earnings estimates may need to come down. Higher wages, freight costs, and material costs will pressure some companies' margins, and consumers could spend less as essential food and gasoline costs pressure budgets. A further retreat to the pre-Covid 2019 S&P 500 Index peak of 3,386 would equate to a reasonable 15x P/E on $225.74 in earnings per share – about a 9.3% reduction to the current 2023 Wall Street consensus estimate.[7] Interestingly, a 29.4% decline from the January 2022 peak to 3,386 would be in line with

[5] From 1928 to 2021.

[6] The S&P 500 Next-Twelve-Months P/E ratio has retreated from 21.1x on 12/31/21 to 15.9x as of 6/30/22, in line with the 16.0x average NTM P/E since 2001. Factset.

[7] As of 6/30/22, the consensus estimate for S&P 500 2023 EPS was $248.94. Factset.

the median 31.15% peak-to-trough bear market decline since World War II shown above. Rallies will occur when investors see signs of peaking inflation and a manageable deceleration in economic activity. Down days will likely reflect expectations for a recession in 2023 and a meaningful earnings contraction.

The market has already corrected 24% – *exactly in line with the median recession-year corrections shown above*. While a further 10-15% decline for the S&P 500 index makes sense based on our analysis above, stocks may have already discounted a mild recession. We remain excited about our companies' long-term revenue growth prospects driven by product cycles and market share gain opportunities. As the bear growls, we are comforted to own quality businesses with an average net debt-to-capital ratio of 37.7%, median 27.3% return on equity, and weighted average 12.5x forward P/E multiple.[8] Our investment posture reflects both the danger in attempting to time the market and the historical return pattern coming out of bear markets. Adding to stocks or at least sitting tight when the S&P 500 has declined 20% has generally proved profitable.

Figure 4: Stocks Do Well After a Bear Market Starts

Date Bear Market Starts	Subsequent S&P 500 12 Month Return
10/21/1957	31.0%
5/28/1962	26.1%
8/29/1966	24.6%
1/29/1970	10.7%
11/27/1973	(28.1%)
2/22/1982	32.1%
10/19/1987	22.9%
3/12/2001	(1.2%)
7/9/2008	(29.1%)
3/12/2020	59.0%
Average	14.8%
Median	23.8%
% Higher	70.0%

Figure 5: Market Timing is Dangerous

Time Invested in S&P 500 Since Jan. 3, 2000	Growth of $10,000	Annualized Performance
Fully invested	$49,427	7.53%
Missed 10 best days	$22,640	3.78%
Missed 20 best days	$13,423	1.35%
Missed 30 best days	$8,613	-0.68%
Missed 40 best days	$5,765	-2.47%
Missed 50 best days	$3,957	-4.13%
Missed 60 best days	$2,803	-5.62%

Figure 4: LPL Research, FactSet. Represents S&P 500 Index performance after going into a bear market since 1950. Performance back to 1950 incorporates performance of the predecessor index, the S&P 90.

Figure 5: As of 12/31/21. Factset.

[8] As of 6/30/22. Harmonic P/E calculation: total equity assets held dividend by total net income attributable to equity holdings. The denominator is the EPS multiplied by the number of shares held for each co. in the equity portfolio, which is then summed. The denominator represents the net income attributable to equity holdings for each given period based on either historical information or consensus estimates from FactSet. Data used to calculate Harmonic P/E is obtained from FactSet.

Fixed Income Performance

The Hamlin Capital Management High Yield Municipal Bond Composite performed well during a very difficult first half of the year, down 2.96%. The last several years of disciplined investment are protecting HCM client portfolios from the pronounced move up in interest rates – even as broader indices and funds in the high yield municipal space fall dramatically.

Our steadfast commitment to putting money to work only at attractive absolute yields on quality non-rated projects has put the portfolio in good position to weather this period of interest rate increases. In addition, consistent focus on credit has helped shelter the portfolio from defaults throughout and following the Pandemic. We will continue to manage through this new volatility with the same steady hand you have come to expect from us here at Hamlin and which guided us through 2008, 2011, 2013 and 2020.

We believe our commitment to absolute return (not just spread investing) and duration management is particularly important and evident in our YTD outperformance. This commitment protected the portfolio during the extreme interest rate volatility in 2020 and is doing so again. For years we have focused on not only buying above market yields but also pursuing bond deals with shorter maturities or with an array of adjustable coupons – fixed for a period with a reset to prevailing rates. This is not a knee-jerk reaction: it has been a thoughtful and purposeful transition we started in 2016. This effort coupled with other variable rate securities, puts, and simply shorter maturities, has produced a portfolio that we believe has stood up to rising rates.

Figure 6: Fixed Income Market Color

	YTD Total Return as of 6/30/22 (Net)	Calendar Year 2021 Total Return (Net)
HCM Main Composite	-2.96%	5.44%
Bloomberg HY Muni Index (LMHYTR)	-11.77%	7.77%
VanEck HY Muni ETF (HYD)	-12.48%	5.05%
iShares National Muni ETF (MUB)	-7.84%	1.02%
iShares Core US Aggregate ETF (AGG)	-10.16%	-1.77%

Please see disclosures for 1yr/5yr/10yr/Inception performance. Non-HCM performance sourced from Bloomberg COMP function; assumes reinvestment of dividends. HYD represents the largest High Yield Municipal Bond ETF by assets and reflects the HY municipal market; MUB represents the largest Investment Grade Municipal Bond ETF by assets and reflects the IG municipal market; AGG is provided for broad fixed income market color; Data accessed on 7/5/2022.

In addition to focusing on the shorter end of the curve, we also continue to implement tried and true strategies to navigate a rising interest environment, including:

- Higher coupons – Compounding large tax-exempt coupon payments in a rising interest rate environment is a defensive force and a potent tool for driving returns. As rates move up, the larger tax-exempt coupons Hamlin clients receive provide them more income to reinvest at the new higher market rates.

- Amortization of debt – Hamlin bond projects actively pay their debt down during the life of the bond. The steady principal payments allow client portfolios to reinvest principal as rates rise.

- Dollar cost averaging – New Hamlin clients are invested slowly over the course of months and even years. If rates move and the market adjusts, the bonds purchased by client portfolios will gradually reflect the new rate environment.

- Yield discipline – In addition to spread discipline, we keep absolute yield levels in mind. While there may be some exceptions, we are committed to targeting minimum absolute yield levels of 6% plus for credit risk assumed on the long end of the yield curve and 5.0% plus inside of 10 years.

As we preach over and over, the key to generating sustainable returns is through the income derived from the generally tax-exempt coupons. That income is not affected by rising interest rates and the ability to reinvest at prevailing interest rates is a powerful multiplier. Further, the steps outlined above that limit the duration of the portfolio and help explain why price moves should be less pronounced than comparable investments that lack these important features.

Market Commentary

Volatility continued in the fixed income markets through the second quarter of the year. Rates continued to rise through April but fell as the market rallied into seasonal/technical strength – only to rise dramatically as June inflation numbers came in higher than expected and the Federal Reserve raised the Federal Funds rate a higher than expected 75 bps. Even after coming down again in the last week of the quarter, the 10-Year Treasury yields moved up another 68 bps this quarter to 2.98% and is up 147 bps YTD from 1.51% where it started. The Fed's 75 basis point hike to a target rate of 1.5% - 1.75% seemed to acknowledge that they had gotten behind the curve in curbing inflation. They have 4 more opportunities to hike this year and are forecasting a 3.375% rate by the end of the year[9], implying more large increases. These moves come as taming inflation becomes their immediate goal – even if those dramatic hikes slow the economy. Municipal bond yields followed Treasuries with 10-year AAA Muni yields climbing 54 basis to finish the quarter at 2.72%.

Municipal mutual funds continued to see large outflows into the second quarter. Total muni funds saw -$76 billion go out the door so far this year while high yield municipal bond funds have lost -$12.93 billion. After the highest year of inflows on record in 2021, this reversal has had a major effect on pricing for both new deals coming to market and projects already in the secondary. Last year, even as interest rates broadly moved up, positive flows kept a lid on rising municipal new issuance yields. This year, without these inflows, the market is seeing major adjustments. The last time we saw significant outflows was in the initial 2020 Covid-19 liquidity-driven sell-off. As you can see in the chart below, cumulative negative flows are now greater than 2020, providing a good indication of just how consistent

[9] Based on the median FOMC dot plot. The FOMC is the Federal Open Market Committee which sets the Federal Funds rate.

outflows have been this year. It is not surprising to us that the opportunity set has dramatically increased as those outflows reached and then surpassed the COVID year downturn.

Figure 7: High Yield Muni Fund Flows



Market Opportunity

This dislocation in rates and reversal of fund flows creates a significant opportunity for HCM clients. After many years of patiently sourcing and negotiating "Hamlin" deals, we are finally seeing the broader "Street" market come back to our levels. We are taking inbound calls from bankers seeking execution on deals in the primary and brokers seeking execution on trades in the secondary. This does not mean that we will change our strict requirements for investment or our commitment to fundamental credit analysis. However, it does mean we are seeing more opportunities in the primary and secondary markets to buy quality names in our sectors at attractive levels.

We opportunistically put client capital to work in the second quarter amidst the market sell off. We are capitalizing on the fact that we have funds to deploy when few others do and using this as an opportunity to increase credit quality and liquidity in the portfolio while simultaneously garnering very attractive total return investments. We are seeking higher coupons as well as capital appreciation for total returns in the 6% plus range and have a healthy issuance calendar lined up for Q3. We are excited about the market right now and pleased with the risk/reward available for clients on new deals.

Credit Update

Our portfolio has come through this volatility with no new defaults due to Covid-19 related issues and no new payment interruptions through 6/30/2022. While the future remains uncertain, we are not currently expecting any projects to cease making payments due to Covid-related issues. We are seeing the benefits now of years of focused and discipline investment in the Hamlin Portfolio.

Senior Living: The broader municipal market saw an uptick in defaults in the senior living space in 2021 with over $1.06 billion across 24 different issuers[10], a trend that has continued in 2022 with another ~$492 million of defaults across 15 different issuers[11]. The Pandemic-induced drop in census and revenue that hit many facilities continues to cause operational issues for many poorly capitalized facilities. There were several highly leveraged and high-profile deals that defaulted last year – all of which Hamlin skillfully avoided. The discipline we have shown over the years continues to benefit investors. While others often buy what is available, we prefer to wait for opportunities to work with quality non-profits on projects with cash equity and a margin of safety built in.

Having made it through the toughest times of the Pandemic, and while we continue to see some stress at projects (and expect more general market deals to default), we are hopeful a corner has been turned in terms of revenue and occupancy. Now that the vaccines and boosters have been distributed and marketing efforts have been restarted, we have seen a quick uptick in activity that is translating into move-ins and new occupancy. While we may have some issues on an idiosyncratic basis, we are confident that our projects will manage through any additional issues and come out strong on the other side.

Education: Defaults in the market for public charter school bonds remain muted. The sector has come through all the Pandemic-associated volatility with very few issues and we do not see any lurking on the horizon at this time. Our schools continue to receive funding alongside other public schools and, as a reserve power of the states, education policy is still largely driven by state governments.

As a reminder, Hamlin manages client assets based on the individual needs of each client. Please contact us if there have been any changes in your financial situation or investment objectives, or if you wish to impose any reasonable restrictions on the management of your account or reasonably modify existing restrictions.

Thank you sincerely for your trust and confidence. Please call (212) 752-8777 with any questions or suggestions.

Joe Bridy • Chris D’Agnes • Deborah Finegan • Charlie Garland • Benjamin Kaufman

Mark Stitzer • Parker Stitzer • Michael Tang

[10] Bloomberg Default & Distress Report as of 12/31/21; includes CCRCs, standalone Assisted Living facilities, and standalone Nursing Facilities; data accessed on 4/7/22.

[11] Bloomberg Default & Distress Report as of 6/27/22; includes CCRCs, standalone Assisted Living facilities, and standalone Nursing Facilities; data accessed on 4/7/22.

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES:

PAST PERFORMANCE DOES NOT GUARANTEE FUTURE RESULTS. Investing, particularly in equities, involves the risk of a loss of principal. Any projections, targets, or estimates in this report are forward looking statements and are based on Hamlin Capital Management, LLC ("HCM")'s research, analysis, and incorporate assumptions made by HCM. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice and HCM undertakes no obligation to update the statements presented herein. While HCM believes the sources of all data provided in this presentation are reliable, HCM does not guarantee accuracy, reliability or completeness. Data is presented as of the date indicated and HCM does undertake any duty to update the information presented here. Top Contributors and Top Detractors are determined relative to contribution to portfolio performance and are subject to change It should not be assumed that investments in the securities identified and discussed were or will be profitable.

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DEFINITIONS

- *AAA MMD Curve is a proprietary yield curve that provides the offer-side of "AAA" rated state general obligation bonds, as determined by the MMD analyst team.*
- *Current yield is calculated by dividing an investment's annual income by the current price.*
- *Bloomberg-Barclays High Yield Municipal Bond Index measures the return of a market value-weighted basket of non-investment grade municipal bonds.*
- *Dow Jones U.S. Select Dividend Index is an index composed of relatively high dividend paying companies.*
- *Duration is a measure of the number of years it takes for an investor to be repaid the price of a security and is a measure of interest rate sensitivity.*
- *PE: The Price-to-Earnings Ratio or PE ratio is a ratio for valuing a company that measures its current share price relative to its per-share earnings. The price-earnings ratio can be calculated as: Market Value per Share / Earnings per Share.*
- *The Russell 1000 Growth Index is a market capitalization-weighted index of the growth segment of the 1,000 largest U.S. public companies.*
- *The Russell 1000 Value Index is a market capitalization-weighted index of the value segment of the 1,000 largest U.S. public companies.*
- *The S&P 500 Index is a market capitalization-weighted index consisting of 500 stocks chosen for market size, liquidity, and industry group representation, with each stock's weight in the Index proportionate to its market value.*
- *Total market capitalization refers to the total dollar market value of a company's outstanding shares of stock.*

Hamlin Capital Management, LLC

Equity Only Composite
GIPS Report
January 1, 2001 through March 31, 2022

Year	Total Firm Assets (mm)	Composite Assets (mm)	Number of Portfolios	Composite Net Return	S&P 500 Return	Russell 1000 Value Return	Internal Dispersion (NET)	Composite 3-Yr St Dev (NET)	S&P 500 3-Yr St Dev	Russell 1000 Value 3-Yr St Dev
*YTD 2022	5,808	1,895	578	-0.96%	-4.60%	-0.74%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2021	5,841	1,891	560	31.32%	28.71%	25.16%	0.65%	18.38	17.17	19.05
2020	4,847	1,442	522	5.36%	18.40%	2.80%	1.40%	17.66	18.53	19.62
2019	4,706	1,610	646	21.54%	31.49%	26.54%	0.55%	9.45	11.93	11.85
2018	4,253	1,504	688	-6.97%	-4.38%	-8.27%	0.64%	10.37	10.80	10.82
2017	4,553	1,772	683	15.84%	21.83%	13.66%	1.29%	10.27	9.92	10.20
2016	3,617	1,623	679	14.93%	11.96%	17.34%	1.26%	11.05	10.59	10.77
2015	3,186	1,373	725	-4.54%	1.38%	-3.83%	0.66%	9.91	10.48	10.68
2014	3,077	1,414	704	10.93%	13.69%	13.45%	0.51%	8.57	8.97	9.19
2013	2,703	1,234	624	32.72%	32.39%	32.53%	1.04%	10.19	11.94	12.69
2012	2,029	798	480	11.03%	16.00%	17.51%	1.12%	12.39	15.09	15.51
2011	1,623	584	388	10.16%	2.11%	0.39%	0.71%	14.11	18.71	20.69
2010	1,033	191	220	20.65%	15.06%	15.51%	2.22%			
2009	714	30	51	20.98%	26.46%	19.69%	2.69%			
2008	584	12	30	-28.57%	-37.00%	-36.85%	4.45%			
2007	734	18	31	3.97%	5.49%	-0.17%	2.86%			
2006	869	29	48	7.90%	15.79%	22.25%	5.93%			
2005	716	31	42	20.80%	4.91%	7.05%	4.90%			
2004	501	19	26	22.80%	10.88%	16.49%	7.67%			
2003	130	8	24	30.40%	28.68%	30.03%	9.87%			
2002	49	5	29	0.90%	-22.06%	-15.52%	6.15%			
2001	21	6	34	0.99%	-11.93%	-5.59%	10.69%			

* Performance represents a non-annualized partial period return ending on March 31, 2022.

Equity Only Composite consists of fully discretionary accounts that are comprised of any amount of common stocks and cash. There is no minimum account size or time period to be included in the composite. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. The exchange rate source for the composite is IDSI/IDC – FT Interactive Data Corporation. The S&P 500 Index and Russell 1000 Value Index are provided as benchmarks. Benchmark returns are not covered by the report of independent verifiers. The Russell 1000 Value Index was added retroactively on 10/1/2020. On 7/1/2021 Hamlin made a material change to total returns from price returns for the Russell 1000 Value Index over the period 2001-2019.

PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. Investing entails the risk of loss of principal. The U.S. Dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented net of management fees and includes the reinvestment of all income. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. The annual composite dispersion is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite performance is presented net of foreign dividend withholding taxes, where applicable, for the period prior to October 1, 2016, and gross of foreign dividend withholding taxes thereafter. Composite performance accrues dividends starting October 1, 2016. The management fee schedule is as follows: 1.00% on all assets. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary. Composite performance is shown net of custodial fees for the period prior to January 1, 2018, and gross of custodial fees and other charges that may occur as a result of a client's choice of service providers thereafter. Beginning 10/1/19, a significant number of accounts in the composite are custodied with a broker that does not charge trading expenses. Accounts custodied with other brokers may incur trading expenses which may reduce returns. As of 3/31/22 date, these accounts represent 21.33% of composite assets.

Hamlin is an independent registered investment advisory firm. Hamlin invests in fixed income and equities for separately managed accounts, as well as funds. In January 2004, Hamlin merged with RRH Capital Management Inc. and the performance returns are linked. The firm maintains a complete list and description of composites and pooled funds, which is available upon request. A copy of our current written disclosure statement discussing our advisory services and fees continues to remain available for your review upon request.

The Equity Only Composite has an inception date of January 1, 2001 and was created April 1, 2006. Hamlin claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Hamlin has been independently verified for the periods January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2008 by Ashland Partners & Company LLP. ACA Performance Services began verification for Hamlin on January 1, 2009 through March 31, 2022. A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedure for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The Equity Only Composite has had a performance examination for the periods January 1, 2001 through March 31, 2022. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request. The policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS reports are available upon request.

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Hamlin Capital Management, LLC
Bond Only Composite
GIPS Report
January 1, 2001 through March 31, 2022

Year	Total Firm Assets (mm)	Composite Assets (mm)	Number of Portfolios	Composite Net Return	BHYMBI Return	Internal Dispersion (NET)	Composite 3-Yr St Dev (NET)	BHYMBI 3-Yr St Dev
*YTD 2022	5,808	1,277	389	-1.66%	-6.53%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2021	5,841	1,293	370	5.43%	7.77%	0.60%	4.15	8.34
2020	4,847	1,062	324	5.17%	4.89%	0.78%	4.18	8.33
2019	4,706	814	260	8.69%	10.68%	0.99%	2.02	3.02
2018	4,253	789	245	4.25%	4.76%	0.64%	3.04	4.91
2017	4,553	733	234	8.22%	9.69%	1.67%	2.82	5.42
2016	3,617	634	219	3.84%	2.99%	0.76%	2.54	5.96
2015	3,186	758	193	4.80%	1.81%	0.77%	0.99	6.35
2014	3,077	538	138	7.18%	13.84%	1.03%	1.14	6.22
2013	2,703	546	190	2.48%	-5.51%	0.84%	1.44	5.90
2012	2,029	474	172	7.43%	18.14%	1.39%	1.52	4.17
2011	1,623	442	173	6.13%	9.25%	0.86%	2.67	7.81
2010	1,033	314	124	7.06%	7.80%	0.84%		
2009	714	220	90	16.35%	32.73%	1.64%		
2008	584	181	67	-16.73%	-27.01%	1.80%		
2007	734	173	50	4.27%	-2.28%	0.96%		
2006	869	153	55	6.81%	10.74%	1.14%		
2005	716	86	53	7.94%	8.58%	1.84%		
2004	501	53	33	8.27%	10.52%	1.61%		
2003	130	18	27	9.14%	13.22%	2.19%		
2002	49	17	29	7.22%	1.97%	2.63%		
2001	21	17	31	4.54%	4.45%	15.07%		

* Performance represents a non-annualized partial period return ending on March 31, 2022.

Bond Only Composite consists of fully discretionary bond only accounts that are comprised of any amount of bonds and cash. There is a 1 year waiting period to be included in the composite. There is no minimum account size for inclusion in the composite. The Bloomberg-Barclays High Yield Municipal Bond Index (BHYMBI) is provided as a benchmark. Benchmark returns are not covered by the report of independent verifiers.

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